Russia Public Opinion
Survey findings from Russia's three major polling organisations — Levada Center, VCIOM, and FOM — read together to compare independent, state-affiliated, and government-run measurement of domestic attitudes toward the war.
Part 1 — Report Timeline & Frequency
Count and cadence of war/SVO-themed reports published by each organisation since February 2022, broken down by year and month where the organisation itself dates it, with links. Click each organisation to expand its full list.
1.1 Levada Center — 53 reports (51 monthly + 2 thematic)
Levada runs a single, consistently-named monthly tracker, «Конфликт с Украиной» (“Conflict with Ukraine”), published roughly one week into the month following the field period. 51 monthly reports were found running March 2022 through June 2026 — the latest available as of 1 August 2026 (no July 2026 report has been published yet, consistent with the usual ~1-week lag) — plus 2 one-off thematic reports that touch the conflict without belonging to the monthly series. This is the only one of the three organisations with a complete, unbroken monthly cadence.
One-off thematic reports (not part of the monthly series):
| Year | Period / topic | Publish date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Possibility of nuclear weapon use in the Ukraine conflict | 2023-06-15 | https://www.levada.ru/2023/06/15/o-vozmozhnosti-primeneniya-yadernogo-oruzhiya-v-ukrainskom-konflikte-2/ |
| 2024 | Level of xenophobia and inter-ethnic tension (war-adjacent, not war-specific) | 2024-05-14 | https://www.levada.ru/2024/05/14/uroven-ksenofobii-i-mezhnatsionalnoj-napryazhennosti-otnoshenie-k-priezzhim/ |
Space for new Levada links (add as published):
| Year | Period / topic | Publish date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|
1.2 FOM (Фонд Общественное Мнение) — 19 entries found, of mixed relevance
Unlike Levada and VCIOM, FOM does not run one standing, identically-named monthly war tracker. War-adjacent questions surface irregularly across several topic sections (Политика/Politics, Мир/World, Безопасность и право/Security & Law, Настроения/Moods, Экономика/Economy, Ценности/Values), usually attached to a specific news hook rather than a fixed monthly cycle. FOM's closest analogue to a continuous tracker is its weekly «Доминанты» (Dominanty) omnibus, but that publishes its data as downloadable PDFs rather than as page content that could be read directly, and the contents pages of the six most recent issues (25–30, June–July 2026) do not list a standing war/SVO-support indicator among their headline categories. This is a structural finding about FOM's approach, not a gap in this compilation — treat FOM's coverage as inherently sparser and more occasion-driven than the other two. Rows marked Unverified are carried over from the original compilation and were not re-opened in this pass; rows marked Confirmed were opened and checked directly.
| Year | Topic | Publish date | Link | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Ukraine — Russia's goals in Ukraine (1st wave) | 2022-03-14 | https://fom.ru/Politika/14698 | Confirmed |
| 2022 | Ukraine, survey of 13 March — Russia's goals (2nd wave) | 2022-03-22 | https://fom.ru/Politika/14702 | Confirmed |
| 2022 | Ukraine, survey of 20 March — Russia's goals (3rd wave) | 2022-03-28 | https://fom.ru/Politika/14706 | Confirmed |
| 2022 | Emigration and emigration sentiment (war-adjacent) | 2022-04-05 | https://fom.ru/Nastroeniya/14712 | Confirmed |
| 2022 | Economy-related item [unverified] | date not independently confirmed | https://fom.ru/Ekonomika/14907 | Unverified |
| 2023 | World-affairs item [unverified] | date not independently confirmed | https://fom.ru/Mir/14853 | Unverified |
| 2023 | Politics item [unverified] | date not independently confirmed | https://fom.ru/Politika/14939 | Unverified |
| 2023 | Science/education item [unverified] | date not independently confirmed | https://fom.ru/Nauka-i-obrazovanie/14949 | Unverified |
| 2024 | Politics item [unverified] | date not independently confirmed | https://fom.ru/Politika/15032 | Unverified |
| 2024 | Mood/attitudes item [unverified] | date not independently confirmed | https://fom.ru/Nastroeniya/15116 | Unverified |
| 2025 | World-affairs item [unverified] | date not independently confirmed | https://fom.ru/Mir/15140 | Unverified |
| 2025 | Economy item [unverified] | date not independently confirmed | https://fom.ru/Ekonomika/15165 | Unverified |
| 2025 | Nuclear weapons — threat perception & disarmament views | 2025-11-20 | https://fom.ru/Bezopasnost-i-pravo/15266 | Confirmed |
| 2025 | Ahead of Putin's Direct Line | 2025-12-18 | https://fom.ru/Politika/15280 | Confirmed |
| 2025 | Values item [unverified] | date not independently confirmed | https://fom.ru/TSennosti/15285 | Unverified |
| 2025 | Mood/attitudes item [unverified] | date not independently confirmed | https://fom.ru/Nastroeniya/15289 | Unverified |
| 2025 | “Results of the year with Putin” — Direct Line reception | date not independently confirmed | https://fom.ru/posts/15290 | Unverified |
| 2026 | Image of Russia (how Russia is perceived abroad — general, not war-specific) | 2026-02-17 | https://fom.ru/Mir/15305 | Confirmed |
| 2026 | NEW — ahead of Defender of the Fatherland Day: army combat-readiness as state priority | 2026-02-20 (approx.) | https://fom.ru/Bezopasnost-i-pravo/15307 | Confirmed |
Space for new FOM links (add as published):
| Year | Topic | Publish date | Link | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
1.3 VCIOM (ВЦИОМ) — 16 entries (11 monitoring-series + 5 thematic)
VCIOM publishes a «Специальная военная операция: мониторинг» (“SVO: monitoring”) report periodically rather than monthly — in practice roughly annually, timed near the February anniversary of the invasion («год спустя» / “one year on”, «два года спустя» / “two years on”, etc.), with occasional extra check-ins. 11 monitoring-series entries were found 2022–2026, plus 5 related thematic reports (information war, veteran reintegration, Defender of the Fatherland Day coverage). The most recent monitoring report (published 2 February 2026, covering January 2026 field data) was opened and verified directly; VCIOM's live listing of all analytical reviews through July 2026 was also checked and contains no newer SVO-specific piece, so this is the latest one publicly available as of 1 August 2026.
Related thematic reports (not part of the core monitoring series):
| Year | Period / topic | Publish date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Information war around the SVO | date not independently confirmed | https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/informacionnaja-voina-vokrug-specialnoi-voennoi-operacii |
| 2023 | Fake news and how to fight it | date not independently confirmed | https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/feik-njus-i-kak-s-nimi-borotsja |
| 2025 | Front and rear in year four of the SVO | date not independently confirmed | https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/front-i-tyl-na-chetvertom-godu-svo |
| 2026 | “Heroes among us” — attitudes toward SVO veterans | date not independently confirmed | https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/geroi-sredi-nas-ili-put-domoi |
| 2026 | Defender of the Fatherland Day | date not independently confirmed | https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/den-zashchitnika-otechestva |
Space for new VCIOM links (add as published):
| Year | Period / topic | Publish date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|
Part 2 — Key Question Comparison
Response data for the three requested questions (support for the war, support for peace negotiations, concern about a wider war) plus other recurring questions identified during this research pass. Figures are the most recent published by each organisation; demographic breakdowns are included exactly where the source itself publishes them — most are Levada's, since its report format is the most granular of the three. Blank rows are left at the end of each block for future updates.
2.1 Support for the war / “special military operation”
| Organisation / date | Question (RU + EN gloss) | Responses (%) | Demographic notes | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Levada Center June 2026 data, pub. 7 Jul 2026 |
«Поддерживаете ли вы действия российских вооружённых сил в Украине?» (“Do you support the actions of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine?”) |
Support: 67% (35% “definitely”, 32% “rather”) Do not support: 24% (11% “definitely not”, 13% “rather not”) (Support down 7pp vs. May 2026; opposition up 8pp) |
Higher: men (73%), 55+ (73%), better-off (70%), Moscow (78%), “right track” (84%), Putin approvers (78%), TV/MAX news (76%). Lower: women (62%), under-25s (50%), worse-off (59%), “wrong track” (44%), Putin disapprovers (34%), YouTube news (49%). |
Levada, 7 Jul 2026 → |
| VCIOM Jan 2026 data, pub. 2 Feb 2026 |
«Поддерживаете ли вы решение о проведении СВО?» (“Do you support the decision to conduct the SVO?”) |
Support: 65% (“rather support”) — matches the level recorded in Feb 2022. Trend: 65% (Feb 2022) → 68% (~1yr) → ~68% (early 2024) → 67% (Jan 2025) → 65% (Jan 2026); fluctuations described by VCIOM as within margin of error. |
Not available — VCIOM's full page could not be retrieved in full by this research pass. Open the source link directly for breakdown tables. | VCIOM, 2 Feb 2026 → |
| FOM 14, 22 & 28 Mar 2022 three tracking waves |
«24 февраля Владимир Путин объявил о начале военной операции на Украине. Как вы считаете, решение о проведении военной операции было правильным или неправильным?» (“...Was the decision to conduct the military operation right or wrong?”) |
FOM asked this exact right/wrong framing only in March 2022 (three weekly waves). The numeric split renders as a chart on FOM's site that could not be extracted as text in this pass. FOM's companion “goals” question was extracted precisely instead — see 2.4. FOM has not re-asked the right/wrong framing in the same words since, based on entries reviewed here. | Not applicable given the data limitation above. | FOM, 14 Mar 2022 → |
Space for future data points on this question:
| Organisation / date | Question (RU + EN gloss) | Responses (%) | Demographic notes | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
2.2 Support for peace negotiations vs. continuing military action
| Organisation / date | Question (RU + EN gloss) | Responses (%) | Demographic notes | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Levada Center June 2026 data, pub. 7 Jul 2026 |
«Считаете ли вы, что сейчас следует переходить к мирным переговорам, или что нужно продолжать военные действия?» (“Should Russia move to peace negotiations now, or continue military action?”) |
Negotiate now: 64% (up 4pp on the month, after a period of decline) Continue military action: 29% |
Negotiations favoured more by: women (68%), under-25s (78%), less-educated (68%), worse-off (70%), rural (71%), “wrong track” (78%), Putin disapprovers (76%), YouTube news (79%). Continuing favoured more by: men (38%), 55+ (35%), university-educated (30%), better-off (32%), Moscow (55%), “right track” (38%), Putin approvers (33%), TV news (35%). |
Levada, 7 Jul 2026 → |
| VCIOM | No directly equivalent negotiations-vs-continue question was located among the VCIOM pages reviewed in this pass. | — not found — | — not found — | VCIOM → |
| FOM | No directly equivalent negotiations-vs-continue question was located among the FOM pages reviewed in this pass. | — not found — | — not found — | FOM Dominanty → |
Space for future data points on this question:
| Organisation / date | Question (RU + EN gloss) | Responses (%) | Demographic notes | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
2.3 Concern about a wider war / nuclear escalation
| Organisation / date | Question (RU + EN gloss) | Responses (%) | Demographic notes | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Levada Center June 2026 data, pub. 7 Jul 2026 |
«Может ли быть оправдано применение ядерного оружия в ходе текущего конфликта в Украине?» (“Could the use of nuclear weapons be justified in the current Ukraine conflict?”) |
Cannot be justified: 60% (40% “definitely not”, 20% “rather not”) Can be justified: 29% (10% “definitely”, 19% “rather”) (Peak for “can be justified” was 39% in Nov 2024; since declined, though slightly up year-on-year) |
“Can be justified” higher: men (33%), 40-54 (33%), large cities (34%), “right track” (37%), Putin approvers (33%), TV/MAX news (34-35%). “Cannot be justified” higher: under-25s (66%), “wrong track” (68%), Putin disapprovers (73%), YouTube news (77%). |
Levada, 7 Jul 2026 → |
| FOM pub. 20 Nov 2025 |
«Существует ли угроза военного конфликта с использованием ядерного оружия?» (“Is there a threat of military conflict involving nuclear weapons today?”) |
Threat exists: 57% No threat: 28% Separately: should strive for full nuclear disarmament — Yes 49% / No 32%; disarmament possible within 20-30 years — Yes 31% / No 40% |
Not broken down by demographic group in the extracted page content (a “parameters” toggle exists on the page but renders client-side). | FOM, 20 Nov 2025 → |
| VCIOM | No directly equivalent nuclear/wider-war concern question was located among the VCIOM pages reviewed in this pass. | — not found — | — not found — | VCIOM → |
Space for future data points on this question:
| Organisation / date | Question (RU + EN gloss) | Responses (%) | Demographic notes | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
2.4 Other recurring questions identified
Additional indicators each organisation tracks that are relevant to this research but weren't explicitly requested — included for completeness.
| Organisation / date | Question (RU + EN gloss) | Responses (%) | Demographic notes | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Levada Center June 2026 |
«Насколько внимательно вы следите за событиями вокруг Украины?» (“How closely are you following events around Ukraine?”) |
Closely following: 43% (18% “very closely”, 25% “fairly closely”) Following without much attention: 38% Not following at all: 19% |
Following more closely: men (47%), 55+ (55%), “right track” (49%), Putin approvers (44%), TV/MAX news (49-50%). Following less: women (39%), under-25s (27%), “wrong track” (38%), Putin disapprovers (40%). |
Levada, 7 Jul 2026 → |
| VCIOM Jan 2026 data, pub. 2 Feb 2026 |
«Проходит ли СВО успешно для российских войск?» (“Is the SVO proceeding successfully for Russian forces?”) |
Successfully: ~65% (described as “nearly two-thirds”) Trend cited by VCIOM: peaked at 70% in March 2022, fell to 59% by Feb 2023, later stabilised around 65%. |
Not published in the excerpt available to this research pass. | VCIOM, 2 Feb 2026 → |
| FOM 14-28 Mar 2022, three waves |
«Как вы думаете, какие цели преследует Россия... в результате этой военной операции?» (“What goals is Russia pursuing through this military operation?” — multi-select, up to 2-3 answers) |
20 Mar 2022 wave: secure Russia's borders / disarm Ukraine / prevent NATO bases 71%; protect DNR/LNR population 52%; change Ukraine's political course 21%; eliminate Ukrainian statehood 10%; don't know 8%. (Full three-wave trend and demographic cuts available at source.) | “Secure borders/prevent NATO” highest among traditional-media news consumers (80%, 13 Mar wave) and 55+ (76%, 20 Mar wave); “eliminate statehood” highest among under-25s (16%, 13 Mar wave). | FOM, 28 Mar 2022 → |
| FOM ~20 Feb 2026 |
«Повышение боеспособности Российской армии — самая главная задача, стоящая сегодня перед государством?» (“Is strengthening the Russian army's combat readiness the state's single most important task today?”) |
Yes, top priority: 66% No, other tasks matter more: 20% |
Not broken down by demographic group in the extracted page content. | FOM, ~20 Feb 2026 → |
Space for future data points / new recurring questions:
| Organisation / date | Question (RU + EN gloss) | Responses (%) | Demographic notes | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
A note on interpreting wartime polling
Public-opinion polling conducted inside an authoritarian state during an active war carries well-documented limitations: social-desirability bias and self-censorship under legal risk (Russia's wartime censorship laws criminalize public dissent about the "special military operation"), declining survey response rates, and difficulty reaching mobilized, displaced, or emigrated populations. Figures on this page are presented with each organization's stated methodology, sample size, and field dates where available, and are not intended to be read as an uncontested measure of genuine public sentiment.
Methodology and verification note: each organisation's most recent report was fetched and checked directly (Levada: June 2026 field data, published 7 July 2026; VCIOM: January 2026 field data, published 2 February 2026). For Levada's monthly archive and VCIOM's periodic archive, links were cross-checked against each organisation's live listing pages rather than individually re-opened one by one. FOM entries are marked Confirmed where the page was opened directly in this pass, and Unverified where the link is carried over from an earlier compilation without being re-opened — FOM has no dated master index the way Levada and VCIOM do.